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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
DURING THE ENERGY TRANSITION








The energy transition from fossil fuels to alternative energy sources has important
consequences for technological change and resource extraction. We examine these
consequences by incorporating a nonrenewable resource and an alternative energy source
in a market economy model of endogenous growth through expanding varieties. During
the energy transition, technological progress is nonmonotonic over time: It declines
initially, starts increasing when the economy approaches the regime shift, and jumps down
once the resource stock is exhausted. A moment of peak-oil does no longer necessarily
occur, and simultaneous use of the resource and the alternative energy source will take
place if the return to innovation becomes too low. Subsidies to research and development
(R&D) and to renewables production speed up the energy transition, whereas a tax on
fossil fuels postpones the switch to renewable energy.
Keywords: Alternative Energy Sources, Endogenous Growth, Energy Transition,
Nonrenewable Resources, Technological Change
1. INTRODUCTION
Economic growth and natural resource use have been intrinsically linked through-
out history. While in the Malthusian era land improvement and expansions allowed
for population increases, in the modern economy era coal and later oil made the
steady growth of manufactured output per capita possible. Because fossil resources
have seemed so abundant for most of the time since the industrial revolution, our
theories of growth could safely ignore the role of resources and focus on capital
investment and technological change. However, fossil resources are nonrenewable
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and at some point resource scarcity will be likely to restrict growth. The limited
availability of our main current sources of energy gives rise to two possible sce-
narios: Either we need to gradually reduce energy use and prevent sudden declines
in energy supply, or substitutes for fossil energy need to be introduced. Both
scenarios involve costs and the natural question is to what extent growth will be
influenced. In particular, the question is how the engine of growth in our modern
economies, namely investment and innovation, will be affected.
To answer this question, we propose a model in which growth is driven by
research and development (R&D) and that integrates the use of energy from
potentially two sources: Nonrenewable (fossil) resources that can be extracted
without cost from the earth’s crust and a form of energy that is produced by
using renewable resources. Nordhaus (1973) was the first one to introduce such a
substitute technology that is not constrained by exhaustibility, which he called a
“backstop technology.” Examples of already available backstop technologies for
natural resources are nuclear energy, solar energy, and wind energy. We contribute
to the literature by studying the effects of the availability of a backstop technology
on the rate of technological progress and on the resource extraction path in an
analytically tractable, general equilibrium model.
Intuition suggests that technological progress as the engine of growth might fal-
ter in the long run, because incentives for developing labor- and capital-augmenting
technology become smaller as resource stocks dwindle and the increasing resource
income share puts downward pressure on the income shares of capital and labor.
Taking the existence of a substitute for fossil fuels into account, however, we
find the opposite result: Technological progress prospers instead of falters when
resource stocks dwindle during the energy transition. Underlying the surge in
innovation is a consumption smoothing motive: Agents convert part of the re-
source stock into knowledge, thereby transferring resource wealth to the backstop
technology era. Moreover, we show that, if the backstop technology is expensive,
a large increase in R&D investment is required for a smooth transition. As a result,
the marginal return to innovation falls sharply and may even become equal to
the return to conserving fossil when the backstop technology is already used. In
this case, part of the consumption smoothing will take place through a regime of
simultaneous use of the resource and the backstop technology. We also find that
due to the availability of the backstop technology, the time profile of resource
extraction may remain upward-sloping until the stock is depleted. Finally, we
show that a research subsidy and a backstop technology production subsidy both
speed up the energy transition, whereas a tax on resource use postpones the switch
to renewables.
The first building block of our analysis is the so-called Dasgupta–Heal–Solow–
Stiglitz (DHSS) model. The DHSS model integrates nonrenewable resources into
the neoclassical exogenous growth framework.1 Although the DHSS model does
not focus on the energy transition toward backstop technologies, some of the early
studies do take the existence of substitutes for the nonrenewable resource into
account. Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981) allow for the
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invention of a backstop technology, which occurs each period with an exogenously
given probability. Kamien and Schwartz (1978) introduce the possibility of under-
taking R&D to affect the probability of invention. In partial equilibrium settings,
Hoel (1978) and Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1982) assume that a backstop technology
already exists. They show that the relative price of the resource compared to the
backstop technology increases over time and the backstop is adopted once prices
are equalized.
Tsur and Zemel (2011) study the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy
in general equilibrium, assuming that both types of energy are perfect substitutes,
as in our model. In their model, the distinctive feature of renewable energy is
that it requires a specific type of capital. Once a stock of capital in the renewable
energy sector has been built up, energy can be generated up to the corresponding
capacity at zero marginal costs. As a result, firms in the renewables sector need to
be forward-looking when they decide whether and how much to invest in capital
that can only be used to generate energy. In contrast, energy generation in the fossil
sector comes with constant marginal costs and does not require any capital. In this
paper, we abstract from investment in the renewables sector. The crucial distinction
in our model between fossil and renewable energy is in terms of scarcity: Fossil
energy is derived from a finite resource stock, whereas renewables have an infinite
resource base. Strikingly, regarding the energy transition, we find a result similar
to Tsur and Zemel (2011). Provided that the price of fossil energy is above a
certain threshold, they also obtain an initial fossil phase, followed by a regime
of simultaneous use and eventually a regime during which only renewables are
used. Like in our case, the existence of an intermediate regime of simultaneous
use is driven by households’ desire to smooth consumption over time. Hence, our
study is complementary to that of Tsur and Zemel (2011): While they abstract
from scarcity in the fossil sector and we abstract from investment in the renewable
sector, we get a similar three-phase pattern of energy generation over time, which
also provides an indication of the robustness of our results.
In the models discussed so far, gradual technological progress was either absent
or exogenous. Barbier (1999) was one of the first to study the role of endogenous
technological change in alleviating resource scarcity. Scholz and Ziemes (1999)
investigate the effect of monopolistic competition on steady-state growth in a
model with a necessary nonrenewable resource.2 More recently, Bretschger and
Smulders (2012) explore the consequences of poor input substitution possibilities
and induced structural change for long-run growth prospects in a multisector
economy. These three endogenous growth models, however, ignore the existence
of a backstop technology for the natural resource. Tsur and Zemel (2003) fill
this gap in the literature, by introducing R&D directed at a backstop technol-
ogy. In their model, accumulation of knowledge gradually decreases the per
unit cost of the backstop technology. Alternatively, Chakravorty et al. (2012)
assume that per unit costs of the backstop technology decrease over time through
learning-by-doing. Both studies, however, are casted in a partial equilibrium
framework.
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Accordingly, the existing literature on nonrenewable resources in which tech-
nological progress is explained endogenously appears to suffer from a dichotomy:
Either backstop technologies or general equilibrium effects are being ignored.
A synthesis of both strands of the literature is, however, desirable and likely to
generate new insights [cf. Valente (2011)]. After all, contrary to the presumption
in the partial equilibrium literature that imposes a fixed resource demand function,
output growth and biased technological change both affect the demand for the
resource. Moreover, changes in the rate of interest induced by the energy transi-
tion should be taken into account, because they affect the level of investment and
innovation, and the extraction path through Hotelling’s rule.
There are a few notable exceptions that are not subject to the dichotomy
criticism. First, Tsur and Zemel (2005) develop a general equilibrium model,
where the unit costs of the backstop technology decrease as a result of R&D.
However, R&D is only possible in the backstop sector, so that effects on ag-
gregate technological progress cannot be addressed. Second, Tahvonen and Salo
(2001) study the transition between renewable and nonrenewable resource in
general equilibrium. In their model, though, technological change results from
learning-by-doing and does not come from intentional investments. Moreover,
they resort to a Cobb–Douglas specification for final output, thereby ignoring
poor substitution between resources and man-made inputs. Third, Valente (2011)
constructs a general equilibrium model in which the social planner optimally
chooses whether and when to abandon the traditional resource-based technology
in favor of the backstop technology. The differences with our analysis are that
Valente abstracts from poor input substitution by imposing Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction, assumes a costless endowment of the backstop technology, and derives
the social optimum instead of the decentralized market equilibrium. Moreover, his
focus on the optimal timing of backstop technology adoption and on the optimal
jumps in output and consumption at the regime switching instant is different
from ours.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
structure of the model. Section 3 discusses the energy transition and regime shifts.
Section 4 provides a numerical illustration. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
We model an economy in which final output is produced with intermediate goods
and energy. The production of intermediate goods requires labor. Energy is derived
from a nonrenewable natural resource that can be extracted at zero costs, or
generated by a backstop technology that uses labor. The elasticity of substitution
between energy and intermediate goods is assumed to be smaller than unity, in
line with the empirical evidence in Koetse et al. (2008) and Van der Werf (2008).
Technological progress in the model is driven by labor allocated to R&D directed
at the invention of new intermediate goods. The remainder of this section describes
the structure of the model in more detail.
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2.1. Production






σ + (1 − θ̄ )M σ−1σ
]σ/(σ−1)
, (1)
where A is a productivity parameter, 0 < θ̄ < 1 and σ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the
elasticity of substitution between energy and the intermediate input.3
The intermediate input is a CES aggregate of intermediate goods kj with an
elasticity of substitution between varieties of 1/(1−β) > 1. At time t , there exists
a mass of N(t) different intermediate goods. When intermediate goods producers
are identical, the equilibrium quantity of variety j is the same for all varieties,
so that kj = k,∀j . By defining aggregate intermediate goods as K ≡ Nk, the









where φ ≡ (1 − β)/β measures the gains from specialization: While keeping
aggregate intermediate goods K constant, the intermediate input M rises with the
number of varieties N through increased specialization possibilities in the use of
intermediate goods [cf. Ethier (1982), Romer (1987, 1990)].
Energy is generated by the nonrenewable resource R and a backstop technology
H :
E = R + AHH, (3)
where AH is a productivity index.
Final goods producers maximize profits in a competitive market. They take their
output price pY , the prices of intermediate goods pKj , the resource price pR , and
the price of the backstop technology pH as given. Because R and H are perfect
substitutes, final good producers will only use the energy source with the lowest
relative price per unit of energy and they are indifferent between the two if their





























N−φ(1−σ) if pH/AH = pR,
(4)
where pE denotes the price of energy.
Firms in the intermediate goods sector need a patent to produce one specific
variety according to the production function kj = lKj , implying K = LK , where
lKj denotes labor demand by firm j and LK is aggregate labor demand by the
intermediate goods sector. Imperfect substitutability between varieties implies
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that the intermediate goods market is characterized by monopolistic competition
[cf. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)]. Each producer maximizes profits and faces a price
elasticity of demand equal to (1 + φ)/φ. As a result, all firms charge the same
price
pK = (1 + φ)w, (5)
where w denotes the wage rate. Profits of intermediate goods producers are used to
cover the costs of obtaining a patent. Combining (5) with the intermediate goods
production function, we obtain an expression for individual profits:
π = pKk − wk = φwK
N
. (6)
The resource market is characterized by perfect competition. Resource owners
can extract their resource at a constant cost, which we normalize to zero. The
initial resource stock is assumed to be of finite size: 0 < S0  ∞. By im-
posing this structure on the resource market, we orient our analysis toward the
exploitation of conventional, proved oil reserves, as opposed the more expensive
and abundant unconventional types of oil reserves (e.g., oil sands and oil shales).
One reason to do this is that, if effective climate policies will be implemented,
a large share of unconventional oil reserves will never be extracted [cf. Van der
Ploeg and Withagen (2012a,b)]. Another reason is that—even without climate
policies—due to the rapidly declining costs of renewable energy [cf. International
Energy Agency (2015b)], unconventional oil with its relatively high extraction
costs probably will not be able to compete with renewable energy. The total world
proved oil reserves were about 1,700 billion barrels at the end of 2014, equal
to 52.5 years of global production [BP (2015)]. Extraction, or “lifting” costs of
conventional oil varied from 4.32 to 11.90 dollars per barrel in 2008 [U.S. Energy
Information Administration (2009)], whereas the average market price for West
Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent Crude oil was about 98 dollars in 2008
[U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015b)]. Hence, when focusing on the
conventional proved reserves, a setting with a finite stock and zero extraction costs
seems appropriate.5
Firms in the perfectly competitive backstop technology sector use labor to
produce energy according to the production function H = ηLH , where LH denotes
aggregate labor demand by the backstop technology sector. The price of one unit




2.2. Research and Development
R&D undertaken by firms in the research sector leads to the invention of new
intermediate goods varieties. Following Romer (1990), we assume that the stock of
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public knowledge evolves in accordance with the number of invented intermediate




where LR denotes labor allocated to research and a is a cost parameter. The right-
hand side of (8) features the stock of public knowledge, to capture the “standing
on shoulders effect”: Researchers are more productive if the available stock of
public knowledge is larger [cf. Romer (1990)].7 Moreover, we assume spillovers
from the stock of public knowledge to the backstop technology sector by imposing
AH = Nφ .8 We define the innovation rate as g ≡ Ṅ/N .
We abstract from technological change in the resource sector. In a related study,
Van der Meijden and Smulders (2017) show that when allowing for resource-
augmenting technical change, there may exist an initial regime in which both
labor-augmenting and resource-augmenting technical change take place. However,
resource-augmenting change vanishes already before the switch to the backstop
technology has taken place. The reason is that resource-augmenting technologies
become obsolete from the moment of the switch onward. By abstracting from
resource-augmenting technical change, in this paper, we focus on the part of the
energy transition during which the future switch to renewable energy has made
investments in fossil-saving technologies unattractive.
Free entry of firms in the research sector implies that whenever the cost of
inventing a new variety, aw/N , is lower than the market price of a patent, pN ,
entry of firms in the research sector will take place until the difference is competed
away. Therefore, free entry gives rise to the following condition:
aw/N ≥ pN with equality (inequality) if g > 0 (g = 0). (9)
Throughout, we restrict our attention to the case of a positive innovation rate. In
equilibrium, investors earn the market interest rate r on their investment in patents:
π + ṗN = rpN, (10)




K + ŵ − g if g > 0, (11)
where hats denote growth rates. The return to innovation depends positively on
K , because of a market size effect. The term ŵ − g takes account of the change
in the patent price over time. The parameter a has a negative effect on the return
to innovation, because it is related negatively to the productivity of researchers.
The parameter φ has a positive effect, because of its positive relationship with the
markup on the price of intermediate goods.
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2.3. Factor Markets
Equilibrium on the labor market requires that aggregate labor demand from the
intermediate goods sector, the backstop technology sector, and the research sector
equals the fixed labor supply LK + LH + LR = K + Hη + ag = L. We define
the income shares of energy and intermediate goods, and the expenditure shares
of the backstop technology and the resource in total energy costs as follows:
θ ≡ pEE
pY Y
, 1 − θ = pKK
pY Y
, ω ≡ pHH
pEE
, 1 − ω = pRR
pEE
. (12)
Using these definitions together with (5) and the backstop production function,
labor market equilibrium implies
K = 1 − θ
(1 + φ)ωθ + 1 − θ (L − ag) . (13)
Resource extraction depletes the resource stock S according to
Ṡ(t) = −R(t), S(0) = S0, R(t) ≥ 0, S(t) ≥ 0, (14)
which implies that total extraction cannot exceed the initial resource stock.
2.4. Households
The representative household lives forever, derives utility from consumption of
the final good, and inelastically supplies L units of labor at each moment. It
owns the resource stock with value pRS and all equity in intermediate goods
firms with value V = pNN . The household maximizes lifetime utility U(t) =∫ ∞
t
ln C(z)e−ρ(z−t)dz, subject to its flow budget constraint V̇ = rV + pRR +
wLS − pY C, and the transversality conditions limz→∞ λV (z)V (z)e−ρz = 0 and
limz→∞ λS(z)S(z)e−ρz = 0, where ρ denotes the pure rate of time preference,
and λV and λS the shadow price of financial wealth and the resource stock S,
respectively. Final output cannot be stored, so that consumption equals output,
i.e., C = Y .
Straightforward manipulations of the standard first-order conditions for the
optimization problem of the representative household yield two familiar rules9:
p̂Y + Ŷ = r − ρ, (15a)
p̂R = r. (15b)
The first one, (15a), is the Ramsey rule, which relates the growth rate of consumer
expenditures to the difference between the nominal interest rate and the pure rate
of time preference. Equation (15b) is the Hotelling rule, which ensures that owners
of the resource stock are indifferent between (i) selling an additional unit of the
resource and investing the revenue at the interest rate r , and (ii) conserving it and
earn a capital gain at rate p̂R .
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3. DYNAMICS OF THE MODEL
In this section, we discuss the dynamics of the model. Because the resource and
the backstop technology are perfect substitutes, only the cheapest of the two will
be used at a particular moment in time. If the two energy sources have equal
prices, simultaneous use may occur. Therefore, three different regimes of energy
use exist: a fossil regime, a simultaneous use regime, and a backstop regime. We
proceed by first describing the dynamic behavior of the economy during each
regime. Subsequently, we describe the energy transition by linking the regimes
together.
3.1. The Fossil Regime
In the fossil regime, energy generation relies exclusively on the natural resource.
The model described in Section 2 with H = 0 imposed can be condensed to a
three-dimensional block-recursive system of differential equations in the energy
income share θ , the innovation rate g, and the reserve-to-extraction rate y ≡ S/R.
The system is block-recursive in the sense that the system of θ and g can be
solved independently from y. Beyond simplifying the mathematical analysis, the
reexpression of the model in terms of θ , y, and g also helps to clarify the economics
behind our results. These variables, namely, have a clear interpretation as they are
indicators of energy scarcity and the rate of technological progress. In this section,
we analyze the (θ, g)-subsystem described in Lemma 1, and we postpone the
solution of the differential equation for y until Section 3.6.
LEMMA 1. Provided that g(t) > 0, the dynamics in the fossil regime are
described by the following two-dimensional system of first-order differential equa-
tions in θ(t) and g(t):







{ρ + θ(t)(1 − σ)φg(t) − [1 − θ(t)(1 − σ)] [r(t) − ŵ(t)]} ,
(16b)
where the term r(t) − ŵ(t) is a function of g(t):
r(t) − ŵ(t) = φ L
a
− (1 + φ)g(t). (16c)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Equation (16a) shows that the energy income share increases if the price per unit of
energy increases relative to the price of intermediate goods, i.e., if r −ŵ+φg > 0.
Expression (16b) is derived from the labor market equilibrium (13), which requires
that the innovation rate declines if the input of labor in the intermediate sector
LK = K increases.
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3.2. Simultaneous Use Regime
The simultaneous use regime is characterized by equal effective prices of the
resource and the backstop technology. As a result, the energy income share will
be constant and the innovation rate will be declining over time, as shown in
Lemma 2.
LEMMA 2. In the simultaneous use regime, the income share of energy θ











The innovation rate is decreasing over time, according to the following differential
equation:
ġ = −g(φg + ρ). (17b)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Intuitively, as long as θ < θS , the resource is relatively cheaper than the back-
stop technology so that only the resource will be used for energy generation. If
θ = θS , effective prices of the resource and the backstop technology are equal,
which enables a regime of simultaneous use as long as θ remains constant. The
declining innovation rate follows from the constant energy income share during
the simultaneous use regime. A constant income share requires that the relative
price of intermediate goods and energy remains unchanged: r − ŵ + φg = 0.
As a result, K goes down over time, because the constant income share implies
K̂ = r − ŵ − ρ. According to (11), g consequently needs to decline in order to
ensure that r − ŵ = −φg < 0 remains satisfied: A decrease in g is needed to keep
the return to innovation from dropping below the rate of interest as a result of the
declining market size.
3.3. The Backstop Regime
The backstop regime is characterized by a constant energy income share and a
constant innovation rate, as described in Lemma 3.
LEMMA 3. In the backstop regime, the energy income share θ and the inno-
vation rate g remain constant and are equal to, respectively,








1 + φ (1 − θB) − ρ. (18b)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Intuitively, Hicks-neutral technological change between the backstop and interme-
diate goods implies a constant energy income share. Given that the resource stock
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is depleted, innovation is the only remaining investment possibility. The constant
income share of intermediate goods implies an unchanging return to innovation,
resulting in a constant innovation rate over time.
3.4. The Energy Transition
Assuming that the initial stock is large enough to get pH(0)/AH (0) > pR(0),
implying that θ(0) < θS = θB , the economy will start in the fossil regime.
Due to increasing scarcity and resource using technological change, the energy
income share increases over time until this inequality is no longer satisfied. At
this moment, the fossil regime will end. Depending on the productivity of the
backstop technology and on characteristics of the innovation process, the switch
to the backstop technology can either take place abruptly or gradually through an
intermediate regime of simultaneous use. Both cases will be discussed in turn.
Abrupt shift. By imposing θ̇ = ġ = 0 in (16a) and (16b), we obtain the





g|ġ=0 = φ(L/a) [1 − θ(1 − σ)] − ρ
(1 + φ) − θ(1 − σ) < g|θ̇=0. (19b)
Moreover, by combining (12) with (15a) and (15b), we get R̂ = θ̂ − ρ, so that the
resource extraction isocline can be written as
g|R̂=0 = g|θ̇=0 −
ρ
(1 − σ)(1 − θ) , (19c)
where we have used (16a) and (16c) to substitute for θ̂ . Figure 1 shows the
phase diagram for the fossil regime in the (θ, g)-plane. The growth rates of the
effective prices of intermediate goods and energy are equal along the flat θ̇ = 0
line, leading to constant income shares. At points below the income share locus,
the effective price of energy relative to the intermediate goods increases, i.e.,
r − ŵ +φg > 0, so that the income share of energy rises over time and vice versa.
The dynamic behavior of θ is illustrated by the horizontal arrows in the phase
diagram. The real interest rate in the fossil regime can be found by combining
p̂Y = θr + (1 − θ)(ŵ − φg) and (16c), which gives








It follows from this expression that the real return to innovation (and hence the
real rate of interest) depends negatively on the energy income share θ , because
a higher income share of energy implies a lower income share of intermediate
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FIGURE 1. Phase diagram: fossil regime. The dashed arrow from point A to point B
represents the equilibrium path when a backstop technology is available. The shaded area
of the phase diagram is not relevant when a backstop technology is available. The dashed
arrow from point D to point E represents the equilibrium path when no backstop technology
is available.
goods and therefore a lower return to innovation. At points above the downward-
sloping innovation locus, the real interest rate and output growth are lower than
in steady-state equilibrium, so that LK = K declines and the innovation rate
increases over time and vice versa. The dynamic behavior of g is illustrated by
the vertical arrows in the phase diagram. The figure also contains the extraction
isocline R̂ = 0, which slopes downward and has a vertical asymptote at θ = 1. At
points above the R̂ = 0 isocline, the real interest rate and therefore output growth
are lower than required for constant extraction, so that extraction growth becomes
negative and vice versa.
Without the existence of a backstop technology, the fossil regime lasts forever
and the economy converges along the stable manifold from point D to point E in
Figure 1.10 This equilibrium path is characterized by an ever decreasing innovation
rate and an energy income share that converges to unity. Peak-oil occurs at point P,
where the equilibrium path crosses the extraction isocline. Because of the vertical
asymptote of the extraction isocline at θ = 1, resource use is necessarily declining
in the long run. The occurrence of peak-oil, however, depends crucially on the
elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods and energy. If this elasticity
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is high enough, the extraction isocline is located entirely below the equilibrium
path. In that case, point P does not exist and extraction is declining throughout.11
When a backstop technology exists, however, the resource will not be used
anymore if θ > θB , which is the case in the shaded area of the figure. In equilibrium,
the resource will then be exhausted at the moment when θ hits θB and the economy
will shift abruptly to the backstop technology. The negatively sloped dashed line
in the figure represents (18b) and gives gB for each possible θB . Hence, point C
shows the steady-state equilibrium in the backstop regime, where the economy
ends up immediately after the switch. The end point of the fossil regime can be
found by using the Ramsey rule (15a), which implies that consumption should be
continuous at each point in time as long as the interest rate is finite. Output in







Hence, given that prices and therefore income shares are continuous, due to the
required continuity of output, K needs to be continuous as well. Accordingly,
labor market equilibrium (13) with ω = 0 before the switch and ω = 1 after the
switch gives
L − ag−FB =
(
1 − θB
θB(1 + φ) + 1 − θB
)
(L − agB) , (22)
where g−FB denotes the innovation rate just before the switch at time TFB from the
fossil to the backstop regime.12 Substitution of (18b) into this expression yields












The positively sloped dashed line in Figure 1 gives g−FB for each possible value of
θB . Point B denotes the end point (θB, g
−
FB) of the fossil regime. The equilibrium
path that leads to the end point B is indicated by the dashed arrow starting at
A. Along this path, the income share of energy is increasing over time and the
innovation rate is higher than it would have been in an economy without the
backstop technology available. The innovation rate is initially decreasing, but
as soon as the economy crosses the innovation locus, the growth rate starts to
increase until the moment of the regime switch. Intuitively, in order to prevent
consumption from falling discontinuously when the resource stock is exhausted,
the representative household now starts to increase savings when the regime
switch comes near. So doing, the household effectively smooths consumption
by converting part of the resource wealth into knowledge, thereby transferring
consumption possibilities to the future regime in which the resource stock is
depleted. In the figure, the extraction path is upward-sloping throughout the fossil
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regime, as the equilibrium path is entirely located below the extraction isocline.
At time TFB , the economy shifts from the fossil to the backstop regime and
the innovation rate jumps down to free enough labor for the production of en-
ergy with the backstop technology while keeping output unaffected. Note that
the end point (θB, g
−









, which is a necessary condition for the abrupt shift from the fossil
to the backstop regime to occur. Proposition 1 summarizes the findings of this
section:





< ρ, the economy shifts abruptly from the fossil
regime to the backstop regime and the innovation rate jumps down at TFB .
Proof. The case in which the economy relies upon the resource forever without
switching to the backstop technology can be excluded, because eventually θ > θB
would hold, implying that the backstop technology is cheaper than the resource.
Hence, there exists a time TFB at which the fossil regime ends. Moreover, due
to the inequality the end point of the fossil regime is located below the income
share locus so that the price of the resource relative to the backstop keeps on
rising until the stock is depleted, which implies that simultaneous use cannot take
place, so that the economy shifts from the fossil to the backstop regime at TFB .
The downward jump in the innovation rate follows immediately when subtracting
(18b) from (23), yielding







Gradual transition. If the inequality in Proposition 1 is violated, the economy
will not experience an abrupt shift from the fossil to the backstop regime. In this
case, the shift in energy usage occurs more gradually, through a regime in which
both energy sources are used simultaneously.





> ρ, the economy shifts from the fossil regime to
an intermediate regime of simultaneous use at TFS .13 Subsequently, the economy
shifts from the simultaneous use to the backstop regime at TSB > TFS . The
innovation rate is continuous and equal to












(1 + φ)(1 − φ) > 0, (26)
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to gB at TSB . During the simultaneous use regime, the real interest rate equals zero,
the backstop expenditure share ω increases, while resource extraction declines
gradually over time.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The negatively sloped dashed–dotted line in panel (a) of Figure 2 represents (26)
and gives g−SB for each possible θB . The end point of the fossil regime is indicated
by B. The economy moves along the equilibrium path from point A to point B
during the fossil regime. The income share of energy increases over time, while the
innovation rate again exhibits a nonmonotonic time profile: It decreases initially
but starts to increase once the economy has passed the innovation locus. If the
equilibrium path starts out below the extraction isocline, resource extraction peaks
at point P and decreases afterward. Once point B is reached, both the levels and
the growth rates of the effective resource and backstop price are equal, and the
economy shifts to the simultaneous use regime. The evolution of the innovation
rate from g+FS to g
−
SB during this regime of simultaneous use of the resource and
the backstop is indicated by the dotted arrow from point B to point C in panel (b).
Once point C is reached, the economy shifts to the backstop technology and jumps
to point D in panel (b) of the figure to free labor for the backstop production while
leaving output unchanged.
The existence of simultaneous use can be explained from the desire to smooth
consumption between the different regimes of energy generation. Because resource
conservation and investment in innovation each provide a channel for households
to smooth consumption, the existence of a simultaneous use regime depends on the
profitability of innovation (i.e., on φ) and on the costs of the backstop technology
(i.e., on θB through η). If innovation revenues would be zero (i.e, if φ = 0),
there would be no investment in R&D at all. Without investment in R&D, there
necessarily exists a regime of simultaneous use. The reason is that if g = 0,
L = LK + LH , so that any jump in LH will imply a jump in LK and hence in
consumption and marginal utility. Therefore, LH must gradually increase from
zero to its long-run value. In a market equilibrium with positive R&D (when
φ > 0), labor market equilibrium reads L = LK + LH + ag so that households
have an additional way to smooth consumption: By reducing innovation at the
time of the regime shift, labor becomes available for energy generation with the
backstop technology without a need to reduce consumption. In scenarios with
profitable innovation possibilities and a relatively cheap backstop technology,
consumption smoothing may completely take place through this new channel:
simultaneous use will not occur. If, however, innovation is less profitable, or the
backstop technology is relatively expensive so that it will absorb a substantial
amount of the labor supply after the regime switch, part of the consumption
smoothing still takes place through a temporary regime of simultaneous use with
a zero real interest rate, during which the production of the backstop technology
starts from zero at the beginning of this regime and gradually increases, until it
jumps up to its constant long-run level at time TSB .
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FIGURE 2. Phase diagrams: (a) fossil regime and (b) simultaneous use regime. In panel
(a), the dotted arrow represents the equilibrium path of the fossil regime. In panel (b), the
dotted arrow shows the equilibrium path of the simultaneous use regime. In both panels,
the irrelevant parts of the phase diagrams are shaded in gray.
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3.5. Consumption: Level and Growth
So far, we have characterized the energy transition in terms of the energy income
share and the innovation rate. In order to clearly see the implications of the
transitional dynamics for consumption, Lemma 4 lists the level and the growth
rate of consumption in each of the three regimes that we have described.
LEMMA 4. The level and the growth rate of consumption (which equals output)
in the three different regimes are given in the expressions below.























1 − φ g(t), Ĉ(t) = −ρ. (27b)






(L − agB) 1 − θB
1 + φθB , Ĉ(t) = φgB. (27c)
Proof. Substitution of (13) with ω = 0 in (21) gives the first expression in (27a).
The second one is obtained by combining (15a) and (20) while noting that C = Y .
To obtain (27b), note that r − ŵ = −φg during a regime of simultaneous use.
Combining this expression with (11) and (13), and with p̂Y = θr+(1−θ)(ŵ−φg)
gives the first and second part of (27b), respectively. Substitution of (13) with
ω = 1 into (21) gives the first part of (27c). Finally, the second part is obtained by
taking the growth rate of the first part and using (18a) and (18b).
The expressions for the level of consumption clearly show that a high-energy
income share depresses consumption. Intuitively, during the fossil regime a high-
energy income share is an indicator of absolute resource scarcity and during the
simultaneous use and backstop regimes, the energy share is positively related
to the production costs of the backstop technology. In the former case, a low
level of resource input lowers output and consumption, whereas in the latter case
consumption possibilities are depressed because energy generation uses up a lot
of resources (i.e., labor).
During the backstop regime, consumption growth is entirely driven by inno-
vation, implying that consumption growth is positive as long as innovation takes
place. In the simultaneous use regime, consumption growth is negative and con-
stant because the real interest rate equals zero. Intuitively, the effect of growing
productivity due to innovation is exactly offset by declining resource input and by
the backstop sector, which uses more and more labor over time. During the fossil
regime, the growth rate is ambiguous: Innovation tends to increase consumption
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over time, but declining inputs of resources and intermediate goods might more
than offset this effect.14
3.6. Initial Condition
To determine the initial value for the energy income share θ , i.e., to find the location
of point A in Figures 1 and 2, we exploit the fact that total resource extraction over
time should be equal to the initial resource stock. From the demand function (4),
we derive a relationship between the income share and the reserve-to-extraction
rate y ≡ S/R at the beginning of the fossil regime:
θ(0)








where the function g = f (θ) is defined by the equilibrium path in the (θ, g)-plane.
A second relationship between θ(0) and y(0) is obtained by deriving from (4) a
differential equation for y:
ẏ = −1 + [ρ − (1 − θ)(1 − σ) (r − ŵ + φg)] y. (29)
In the simultaneous use regime, (11)–(13) imply r −ŵ = −φg, so that differential
equation (29) can be expressed in terms of y only. In the fossil regime, substitution
of (16c) yields an expression in terms of y, θ , and g. The end condition for y is
given by y(T −FB) = 0 in the scenario without simultaneous use and by y(T −SB) = 0
in the scenario with simultaneous use. Using the already determined paths for
θ , g, and ω, the differential equation for y gives a unique equilibrium path in
the (θ, y)-plane. The initial point (θ(0), y(0)) is given by the intersection of this
equilibrium path with (28) in the (θ, y)-plane.
4. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we perform numerical simulations of the model to quantify the
transitional dynamics of the model.15 Moreover, we will explore the effects of
taxes and subsidies on the energy transition. We focus on a scenario in which an
intermediate regime of simultaneous use exists. As a robustness check, we also
provide simulation results for a formulation of our model in which the resource and
the backstop technology are good instead of perfect substitutes, according to a CES
function.16 We first calibrate the model and then present the simulation results.
Van der Werf (2008) reports elasticities of substitution between a capital-labor
aggregate and energy ranging from 0.17 to 0.61.17 We take the average of these
values to obtain σ = 0.4. By choosing φ = 0.25, we get a markup of prices
over marginal costs within the range of estimation results that Roeger (1995)
reports for the US manufacturing sector. Recall φ ≡ (1 − β)/β, which implies
that φ = 0.25 corresponds to an elasticity of substitution between the different
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varieties 1/(1 − β) of 5. We set the production function parameter θ̄ and the rate
of pure time preference ρ to 0.1 and 0.01, respectively. Labor supply L and the
initial knowledge stock N0 are normalized to 1 and 0.1, respectively. The initial
resource stock is chosen such that the initial share of resource expenditures in gross
domestic product (GDP) θ(0) equals 7.5%, in line with the average US energy
expenditure share in GDP over the period 1970–2009 [U.S. Energy Information
Administration (2012)]. We use the research productivity parameter a to obtain
an initial consumption growth rate Ĉ(0) of 1.7%, which is equal to the average
yearly growth rate of GDP per capita in the United States over the period 1970–
2010 [The Conference Board (2012)]. By imposing A = 166, we obtain an initial
global GDP of 78 trillion US 2014 dollars, in line with the global GDP in 2014
[World Bank (2015)].
Our benchmark calibration implies an initial reserve-to-extraction rate of
y(0) = 52, which lies within the range of the reserve-to-production ratios for oil,
natural gas, and coal in 2008 of 44, 58, and 127, respectively [U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration (2012)]. Initially, the ratio between the per unit energy price
of the backstop technology and the resource amounts to 4.18 This ratio is within the
range of the projected levelized cost of electricity generated with renewable energy
sources relative to the levelized cost of electricity generated by fossil fuels in the
electricity sector in the United States in 2020, which varies from 0.77 to 5.43, ac-
cording to Table 2 in U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015a).19 In our cal-
ibrated model, the current era in which energy generation relies on fossil fuels ends
in roughly 45 years. In reality, the current share of renewables in total energy supply
is already positive: the global share amounted to 13.2% in 2012 [International En-
ergy Agency (2015a)]. The zero initial share in our model is due to the assumption
of perfect substitutability between fossil and renewable energy. However, in this
section, we will also investigate the case of imperfect substitution as a robustness
check in which renewable energy use is strictly positive from the beginning.
4.1. Transitional Dynamics
Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the saddle path in the (θ, g)-plane generated by our
simulation. Panels (b)–(f) depict the time profiles during the energy transition (i) in
our benchmark model (solid black lines), (ii) in a world similar to the benchmark
economy, but without the availability of a backstop technology (solid gray lines),
and (iii) in a model in which the resource and the backstop technology are good,
but imperfect substitutes (dashed lines).
In panel (a), the black dots depict the equilibrium path leading to the imple-
mentation of the backstop technology, whereas the gray dots show the saddle path
toward the fossil steady state. In both cases, the economy moves from left to right
in the diagram. The solid and dashed black lines in panel (b), representing the
scenarios with perfect and imperfect substitution, almost coincide. They show
that the energy income share gradually increases over time during the energy
transition, until the level θB is reached, after which it will be constant. In the
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FIGURE 3. Saddle paths and time profiles. The solid lines represent the benchmark sce-
nario in which a backstop technology that provides a perfect substitute for the resource is
available. The gray line represents the scenario in which there is no backstop technology
available. The dashed line represents the scenario in which a backstop technology provides
a good, but imperfect substitute for the resource. In the latter scenario, η is adjusted to
obtain θ∞ = θB .
model without the backstop technology, the income share starts at a higher level
and is monotonically increasing, asymptotically approaching unity in the long run.
The solid black line in panel (c) depicts the time profile of the innovation rate
during the energy transition. The innovation rate first decreases slightly over time,
but starts to increase after the stable manifold has crossed the innovation locus.
During the simultaneous use regime, the innovation rate is declining. When the
shift to the backstop technology takes place, the innovation rate jumps down to its
constant long-run level. The gray line shows that, in contrast to the benchmark case,
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innovation in a world without the backstop technology decreases monotonically
over time and starts out lower. As shown by the dashed lines, the imperfect
substitutes model yields time paths that, though smoother, are quite similar to
those generated by our simpler model in which the resource and the backstop
technology are perfect substitutes.
Panel (d) shows that resource extraction is increasing initially, peaks just before
the economy switches to the simultaneous use regime and then decreases rapidly
until the resource stock is exhausted. Due to the finite exhaustion time, extraction
starts out considerably higher than in the model without a backstop technology.
According to panels (e) and (f), consumption is initially growing during the tran-
sition toward the backstop technology. When the implementation of the backstop
technology is near, consumption growth rapidly declines and even turns negative
at the end of the fossil regime and during the simultaneous use regime. At the
moment of the switch to the backstop technology, consumption growth jumps up
and remains positive and constant forever. In the model without the backstop,
consumption is relatively lower. The time profile of consumption is initially in-
creasing. Over time, consumption growth decreases and eventually turns negative.
4.2. Comparative Dynamics
So far, we have abstracted from government intervention. In this section, we
extend our baseline model to include different policy instruments. We will focus
on instruments that are typically associated with affecting the energy transition: an
R&D subsidy, a renewables subsidy, and a carbon tax.20 More specifically, we will
introduce a constant ad valorem subsidy to production of energy with backstop
technology, sH , a constant ad valorem subsidy to profits from R&D, sN , and a




(1 + sN), (30a)
pH = w
η
(1 − sH ), (30b)
p̂R = r pR − τR
pR
. (30c)
We investigate the introduction of ad valorem backstop and research subsidies
of 20% (i.e., sH = sN = 0.2) and of the specific tax on fossil fuel use equal to
20% of the initial resource price (i.e., τR = 0.2 × pR(0) = 0.0122). The solid
lines in Figure 4 are the time profiles in the benchmark scenario without subsidies
and taxes. The dashed lines represent the scenario with sH = 0.2. Comparing the
dashed lines with the solid lines in panel (a), we observe that the backstop subsidy
increases initial fossil fuel use. The reason is that the subsidy effectively makes
the substitute to fossil fuels cheaper. As a result, the initial fossil fuel price drops.
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This effect of an increase in initial fossil fuel use upon an increase in subsidies for
renewable energy is known in the literature as the “Green Paradox” [Sinn (2008),
Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2015)]. Panels (a) and (b) show that the backstop
subsidy brings forward the switch to the backstop technology and increases the
long-run energy supply. As shown in panel (c), the energy income share is lower
throughout due to the backstop subsidy. In panel (d), we note from the dashed lines
that the long-run innovation rate goes down upon the introduction of a backstop
subsidy, due to a reallocation of labor from R&D to the generation of energy.
The effects of subsidizing R&D are shown by the dotted lines. Comparing
these with the solid lines, we observe that the R&D subsidy increases innovation
throughout [panel (d)]. Furthermore, due to its enhancing effect on resource-using
technical change, the subsidy to R&D brings forward the switch to the backstop
and increases resource use before the switch [panel (a)]. Because the relative
scarcity of fossil fuels compared to labor goes down in production, the subsidy
lowers the initial resource income share [panel (c)]. Furthermore, the reallocation
of workers toward the research sector lowers the long-run energy supply [panel
(b)]. Finally, as shown by the dash–dotted lines, the fossil fuel (or: carbon) tax
lowers initial resource use and delays the transition to the backstop technology,
but does not have long-run consequences.
5. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the effects of the availability of a backstop technology on the
time paths of resource extraction and the rate of technological progress, taking into
account that natural resources and man-made inputs are poor substitutes and that
generation of energy with the backstop technology is costly. To this end, we intro-
duce a nonrenewable resource and a backstop technology in a simple endogenous
growth model. The backstop technology can be used to produce a perfect substitute
for the natural resource. Technological progress is driven by workers in R&D, who
build upon previously generated knowledge. We solve the model analytically and
develop a graphical apparatus to visualize its transitional dynamics and regime
shifts. Moreover, we quantify the results by calibrating the model and performing
a simulation analysis. The results are robust to relaxing the assumption of perfect
substitutability between the resource and the backstop technology.
Our main findings can be divided into three categories: energy regimes, tech-
nological change, and resource extraction. Regarding the first category, we find
that the economy experiences different regimes of energy generation. Initially, the
economy relies exclusively on the natural resource. In the long run, the natural
resource will be abandoned in favor of the backstop technology. In between these
two regimes, there may exist an intermediate era during which the resource and the
backstop technology are used simultaneously. This feature is noteworthy, because
the model does not impose the convexities in resource extraction or backstop
production costs that are normally required to obtain this result. The reason for the
existence of a regime of simultaneous use is the desire to smooth consumption:
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FIGURE 4. Effects of subsidies and taxes. The solid lines represent the benchmark scenario. The dashed and dotted lines give the cases with
a subsidy to production with the backstop technology (sH = 0.2) and a subsidy to research and development (sN = 0.2), respectively. The
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By introducing the backstop technology gradually during the simultaneous use
regime, households effectively shift part of the resource wealth to the future. We
show that a subsidy for R&D and a subsidy for the generation of energy by the
backstop technology both speed up the energy transition, whereas a tax on fossil
fuel use postpones the switch to renewables.
Second, the introduction of a backstop technology in the model crucially affects
the shape of the time path of technological progress, measured by the rate of inno-
vation. Instead of monotonically decreasing as it would be without the backstop
technology, the rate of innovation exhibits a nonmonotonic development over
time: It first decreases gradually, but during the run-up to the backstop technology
it starts to increase. The reason for the surge in innovation is again consumption
smoothing: By investing in innovation, households effectively convert resource
wealth into knowledge, thereby shifting consumption possibilities to the future in
which energy generation is costly. If the return to investment in innovation remains
high enough, consumption smoothing entirely takes place through investment in
innovation so that the simultaneous use regime disappears. Once the economy
enters the backstop regime, the rate of innovation jumps down to its long-run
value to release resources for production in the backstop sector. During the entire
transition towards the backstop regime, the rate of innovation is strictly higher
than it would have been without the availability of a backstop technology.
Third, the introduction of the backstop technology has notable implications
for the development of resource extraction over time. The resource extraction
path does no longer have to become downward-sloping eventually. Depending
crucially on the elasticity of substitution between energy and man-made inputs,
the extraction path can be monotonically upward-sloping or downward-sloping
until exhaustion, or exhibit an internal maximum, known as “peak-oil.”
The most important direction for further research is the introduction of stock-
dependent extraction costs and pollution from combustion of the natural resource.
In combination with the backstop technology, these features make it interesting to
compare the decentralized outcome to the social optimum, in order to shed light
on optimal environmental policy. Another useful extension of the current analysis
would be the introduction R&D activities in the resource and backstop sector, so
that the direction of technological progress becomes endogenous.
NOTES
1. The DHSS model consists of Dasgupta and Heal (1974), Solow (1974a,b), and Stiglitz (1974a,b).
Recently, Benchekroun and Withagen (2011) have developed a technique to calculate a closed-form
solution.
2. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), a natural resource is defined to be “necessary” if production
is zero without input of the resource.
3. Time arguments are omitted if there is no possibility of confusion.
4. Appendix A.1 derives the relative factor demand by solving the profit maximization problem of
final good producers.
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5. In Section 4.2, we discuss the introduction of a specific tax on oil extraction, which has similar
effects as a positive constant extraction costs.
6. We abstract from investment in the backstop technology sector, implying that firms in the
backstop sector do not need to be forward-looking. The case with investment and forward-looking
firms in the backstop technology sector is studied in Tsur and Zemel (2011). They, however, abstract
from scarcity of fossil resources to keep their model tractable. In terms of the energy transition, both
approaches result in similar outcomes.
7. Ang and Madsen (2015) provide estimates of the “ideas production function” using data over
the past 140 years. They find empirical evidence for strong knowledge spillovers, with a coefficient
for the knowledge stock consistently close to one, as we have implicitly assumed in (8).
8. The assumption of AH = Nφ implies Hicks-neutral technological change between intermediate
goods and the backstop technology. Technically, the assumption ensures that the energy income share
is constant in the backstop regime, as discussed in Section 3.3. Making this assumption is equivalent
to assuming that the backstop is produced by using final output instead of labor.
9. Appendix A.1 derives the solution to the utility maximization problem of the representative
household.
10. Appendix A.3 shows that point E in Figure 1 is the only attainable steady state of the model
without a backstop technology that satisfies the transversality condition.
11. Note from (19c) that
∂g|R̂=0
∂σ
< 0 and limσ→1 g|R̂=0 = −∞, so that extraction would be
declining throughout with Cobb–Douglas production.






= ρ, the simultaneous use regime is degenerate with TFS = TSB .
14. The growth part of equation (27a) could be used to plot a consumption growth isocline g|Ĉ=0 =
g|θ̇=0 − ρ1−θ in the phase diagrams of Figure 1 and panel (a) of Figure 2, which divides the phase
diagrams in two regions: one with positive and one with negative consumption growth. This isocline
has a vertical intercept between the extraction and income share locus and tends to minus infinity if
the energy income share tends to unity.
15. For the simulation, we use the relaxation algorithm reported in Trimborn et al. (2008).
16. The specification of the CES function is E = [ω̄(AH H)(γ−1)/γ + (1 − ω̄)R(γ−1)/γ ]γ /(γ−1)
with ω̄ = 0.9 and γ = 50.
17. Chen (2017) develops a new empirical strategy to estimate the elasticity of substitution in the
presence of biased technical change. He, however, applies his method to capital-labor instead of
capital-labor-energy substitution.
18. Using (4), this ratio is given by β/η[θ̄/(1 − θ̄ )]σ/(1−σ)[(1 − θ(0))/θ(0)]1/(1−σ).
19. The levelized costs of energy are defined as “the per-kilowatthour cost (in real dollars) of
building and operating a generating plant over an assumed financial life and duty cycle” [U.S. Energy
Information Administration (2015a, p. 1)].
20. Our model features two different market failures: imperfect competition in the market for inter-
mediate goods and intertemporal knowledge spillovers in the research sector. As a result, implementing
the social optimum in a decentralized equilibrium requires a subsidy to the production of intermediate
goods and a research subsidy.
21. The introduction of sH , sN , and τR will affect the equations (13), (16a)–(17a), (18b), (19a),
(19b)–(20), (22), (23)–(26), (28), and (29) as well. Details are available from the authors upon request.
22. The simultaneous regime can only exist if the g−FB line intersects the income share locus of the
fossil regime, which requires φ < 1.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains the derivations of the mathematical results in the main text.
A.1. HOUSEHOLD AND FIRM BEHAVIOR














pKjkjdj − pRR − pH H + pE
(
R + NφH − E) . (A.1)
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= pE − pR ≤ 0, (pE − pR)R = 0, (A.2c)
∂L
∂H
= pENφ − pH ≤ 0, (pENφ − pH )H = 0, (A.2d)
where we have used pKi = pKj ≡ pK, ∀ i, j . Combining (A.2a)–(A.2d) with H = 0
(R = 0) gives the first (second) row in (4). The third row of (4) follows from combining
(A.2a)–(A.2d) with pH N−φ = pR imposed.
The Hamiltonian associated with the utility maximization problem of the representative
household reads
H = ln C + λV
[
rV + pRR + wLS − pY C
] − λSR. (A.3)




= 0 ⇒ 1
C
− λV pY = 0 ⇒ Ĉ + p̂Y = −λ̂V , (A.4a)
∂H
∂R
= 0 ⇒ λV pR − λS = 0 ⇒ λ̂V + p̂R = λ̂S, (A.4b)
∂H
∂S
= − λ̇S + ρλS ⇒ λ̇S + ρλS = 0 ⇒ λ̂S = ρ, (A.4c)
∂H
∂V
= − λ̇V + ρλV ⇒ λV r = −λ̇V + ρλV ⇒ λ̂V = ρ − r. (A.4d)
Combining (A.4a) and (A.4d) gives the Ramsey rule (15a). The first-order conditions
(A.4b)–(A.4d) yield the Hotelling rule (15b).
A.2. PROOFS OF LEMMATA AND PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Lemma 1. By substituting the labor market equilibrium (13) with ω = 0
imposed into (11), we find expression (16c) for the return to innovation in the fossil regime.
We use the expenditure share definitions in (12) to rewrite the first line of the relative
demand function (4):
θ








Nφ(1−σ) ⇒ θ̂ = (1 − θ)(1 − σ) (r − ŵ + φg) . (A.5)
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This completes the derivation of expression (16a) in Proposition 1. To obtain the second
expression in the proposition, we first differentiate the labor market equilibrium condition
(13) to get
K̂ = − ġ
(L/a) − g . (A.6)
By converting the energy income share definition (12) into growth rates while using the
intermediate goods price (5) and the Ramsey rule (15a), we obtain
θ̂ = −1 − θ
θ
[
ŵ + K̂ − (r − ρ)] . (A.7)
Combining (A.5), (A.6), and (A.7), we find (16b) in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. In the simultaneous use regime, the effective prices of the resource and
the backstop technology must be equal, as in the third line of (4):
pH N
−φ = pR. (A.8)
Substitution of pE = pH N−φ and (A.8) into the third line of the relative demand function
(4) and by using pK/pH = η(1 + φ) from (5) and (7) gives
θ







which implies θ = θS and therefore proves the first part of the lemma. To proof the second
part, we convert (A.8) into growth rates:
p̂H − φg = p̂R ⇒ r − ŵ + φg = 0, (A.10)
where the latter expression uses (7) and (15b). Substituting (A.10) into (11), we find
−φg = φ K
a
− g. (A.11)
Using (5), (12), (15a), (15b), and θ̂ = 0 together with (A.11), we obtain
ĝ = K̂ = −φg − ρ, (A.12)
which gives rise to the differential equation in Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using pK/pH = η(1 + φ) from (5) and (7), the relative factor










which can be solved for θ to obtain θB . Combining the innovation return (11), the income
share definition (12), labor market equilibrium (13), the Ramsey rule (15a), and the relative
















− g − ρ
]
. (A.14)
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Because this differential equation is unstable in g, the innovation rate immediately settles
down at its steady-state value given by the second expression in Lemma 3.
Proof of Proposition 2. The case in which the economy relies upon the resource forever
without switching to the backstop technology can be excluded, because eventually θ > θB
would hold, implying that the backstop technology is cheaper than the resource. Hence,
there exists a time at which the fossil regime ends. If there would not exist a regime of
simultaneous use, continuity of consumption requires that the end point of the fossil regime
would be given by (θB, g
−






Therefore, the dynamic path in the fossil regime that leads to (θB, g
−
FB) would necessarily
intersect the vertical θB line before the fossil regime has ended. This would imply that
only the resource is being used while the backstop technology is relatively cheaper, which
violates optimality of the behavior of final good producers. As a result, there exists a
time TFS at which the economy shifts from the fossil to the simultaneous use regime.
The simultaneous use regime cannot last forever, because the innovation rate is decreasing
throughout a regime of simultaneous use, according to (17b), while (13) and (11) together
with r − ŵ = −φg imply a strictly positive lower bound on g due to ω ≤ 1. Therefore,
there exists a time TSB ≥ TFS at which the economy shifts from the simultaneous use to
the backstop regime.
We continue by showing that the innovation rate is continuous at TFS . Together with the
labor market equilibrium (13) with ω−FS = 0, the continuity of output requires
L − ag−FS =
1 − θB





Substituting the labor market equilibrium (13) into the innovation return equation (11) and
noting that r − ŵ = −φg, we get
ω = φL − ag




Using this relationship to substitute for ω+FS in (A.15), the matching condition reduces to
L − ag−FS =
a
φ
(1 − φ)g+FS. (A.17)
We have already argued that the innovation rate g−FS cannot exceed φL/a. Moreover, given
that ω ≥ 0, it follows from (A.16) that the innovation rate g+FS cannot exceed φL/a either.
Consequently, the only solution to (A.17) reads g−FS = g+FS = φL/a.
To prove the downward jump of the innovation rate at TSB , first note that, as a result of
the required continuity of output, the labor market equilibrium (13) with ωB = 1 implies
1 − θS
ω−SBθS(1 + φ) + 1 − θS
(
L − ag−SB
) = 1 − θB
θB(1 + φ) + 1 − θB (L − agB) .
Substitution of (A.16) for ω−SB on the left-hand side and (18b) for gB on the right-hand
side, gives equation (26), where g−SB > 0 follows from φ < 1, which is required for the
simultaneous use regime to exist.22 Subtracting (18b) from (26), we find
g−SB − gB = φg−SB + ρ > 0,
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implying that the innovation rate jumps down at TSB .
Finally, we show that the real interest rate equals zero, that the backstop expenditure
share increases, and that resource extraction decreases over time during the simultaneous
use regime. Using p̂Y = θr + (1 − θ)(ŵ − φg), the real interest rate can be written as
r − p̂Y = −θS (r − ŵ + φg) = 0, (A.18)




β(1 − θS) + ωθS
ωθS
(φg + ρ) > 0. (A.19)
By using the expenditure share definition (12), the Hotelling rule (15b), the backstop price
(7), and Ê = K̂ = −φg − ρ, we obtain
R̂ = − ω
1 − ω ω̂ − ρ = −
φ2(1 − θS)L + a
[
(1 − φ)(1 + φ) + φ2(1 − θS)
]
ρ
aθS(1 − φ)(1 − ω)(1 + φ) < 0,
(A.20)
where the last equality uses (A.16) and the labor market equilibrium (13).
A.3. STEADY STATES
Here, we show that point E in Figure 1 is the only attainable steady state of the model
without a backstop technology that satisfies the transversality condition.
PROPOSITION 3. The only attainable internal steady state of the model without a
backstop technology that satisfies the transversality conditions is given by point E in
Figure 1.
Proof. Using asterisks (∗) to denote steady-state values of this model, the other three
steady states of the model satisfy
g∗ = L
a
, θ∗ = 1, (A.21a)
g∗ = L
a





− βρ, θ∗ = 0. (A.21c)
The first two steady states (A.21a) and (A.21b) do not satisfy the transversality condition,
because substitution of K∗ = L − ag∗ = 0 into (16c) implies (r − ŵ)∗ = −g∗ < 0 and
the transversality condition in growth rates requires
lim
t→∞
= p̂N (t) + N̂(t) − r(t) ≤ 0 ⇒ lim
t→∞
r(t) − ŵ(t) ≥ 0, (A.22)
where the second inequality uses (9). Hence, the two steady states with (r−ŵ)∗ = −g∗ < 0
do not satisfy the transversality condition. Steady state (A.21c) is located at the intersection
of the innovation locus with the θ = 0 line, and below the income share locus in the (θ, g)-
plane. It is immediately clear from the dynamics around this point in Figure 1 (θ̇ > 0) that
this steady state cannot be attained. The economy can only be situated here if there is an
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infinite amount of oil available from the beginning (so that θ∗ = 0), which is impossible.
Point E in Figure 1 satisfies the transversality condition, as (r − ŵ)∗ = ρ > 0 in this
equilibrium.
A.4. INITIAL CONDITION
By using (11)–(13), r − ŵ = −φg in the simultaneous use regime, and (16c) in the fossil
regime, differential equation (29) can be expressed as
ẏ = −y(1 − θ)(1 − σ) (φ L
a
− g) + yρ − 1, if t < TFS,
ẏ = −1 + yρ, if TFS ≤ t ≤ TSB.
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